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By now we have all heard the issues framed. A young five-year-old boy
is found clinging to a life raft after two days at sea adrift. He is a victim of a
terrible accident, resulting from his mother's attempts to immigrate to the
United States from Cuba. Paying thousands of dollars, a boat-load of hopeful
refugees overturns in high seas while making the ill-fated, dangerous journey
ninety miles across the Florida straits. The boy, his mother and her new
husband are cast into the sea with all future hope for a newer, freer life lost.
The mother and husband peril at sea, while the young boy's spirit for life
triumphs and he somehow manages to survive for two days at sea holding unto
a life ring. The boy is rescued at sea by passing fishermen. Dehydrated, but
alive, one would think that Elian Gonzalez's nightmare was over. But
unfortunately for him and his immediate and extended family in the United
States and Cuba, the worst was yet to come. Elian was about to become a part
of the highest profile, political and legal debate to rock Cuban-American
* Candidate for Juris Doctor May 2000, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law
and a staff member of the ILSA Journalof Internationaland ComparativeLaw.
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politics in years. Without the love of his mother, he was about to become a
political pawn of both governments, unleashing over forty years of resentment
harbored by supporters and dissidents of the Cuban Revolution in the United
States and Cuba. Elian's story was just beginning.
Immediately, Elian's family, part of the politically powerful Cuban exile
community in Miami, sought for the boy to remain with them while his fate was
to be determined. Elian's family, at once, filed with the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) to keep the boy in the United States. The resulting
ruling was that only Elian's father in Cuba could speak for the boy and that he
would have to be returned to Cuba by January 14, 2000.' The extended family
in Miami then filed in state court for temporary custody to stay the return
deadline until Elian's fate could be determined in a United States court. While
legal posturing ensued, President Fidel Castro continued making demands,
organizing rallies, and acting as liaison between the boy's father, Juan Miguel
Gonzalez, and the rest of the world media, personally calling for the boy's
immediate return and an end to the "kidnapping" of Elian Gonzalez. The boy's
extended family in Miami continued on their track of legal maneuvering to keep
the boy here in the United States.
This article will attempt to describe some of the legal issues surrounding
the hotly contested legal debate of whether six year old, Elian Gonzalez should
remain in the United States with his extended family or return to Cuba to live
with his father. One aspect of this legal debate, that has not entirely surfaced
within the courts, is the international legal authority controlling on the issue.
To this point, most legal and political action has taken place at the state court
level controlling the family law issues and the Federal level regarding the
immigration issues. This paper will focus on the international legal aspects
surrounding this case, while merely describing the other legal involvement as
a backdrop.

I.

HISTORY OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS TO DATE

Upon Elian's arrival to the home of his extended family in Miami, the
family filed with the INS to keep the boy in Miami, while his father remained
in Cuba. This was the first of many actions to try to keep the boy in the United
States. On January 5, 2000 an INS Commissioner, Doris Meissner said that an
INS investigation did not find any information calling into question the father's
paternal and legal rights.2 Under United States law, any Cuban is eligible to
apply for permanent residence upon reaching this country. Because Elian is
I.
Mike Williams & Jenny Staletovich, INS DecisionSparks Miami Protests, Palm Beach Post,
January 8,2000 at IA, I IA.
2.
Karen DeYoung & Sue Anne Pressley, INS Orders Boy's Return to Cuba, Washington Post,
January 6, 2000 at A01.
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"too young to make legal decisions for himself," Meissner stated, "the only
question before INS was who could legally represent him in deciding whether
to make that application."3 Demonstrations and letters to the Attorney General
and President of the United States ensued and the response was that the INS
ruling would stand.4 The INS also invited the boys father to come to the United
States, in which they would order a temporary visa for him to do so, to pick up
Elian.5
Elian's Miami relatives appealed the INS decision in federal court, where
his lawyers have asked the court to issue a temporary restraining order against
the INS ruling mandating Elian's return to his father in Cuba.6 The Justice
Department stated that it will ask the United States Court of Appeals to address
the issue, calling it an emergency. 7
On other legal fronts, the extended family filed a petition to appoint a
guardian for Elian in state court in Miami, Florida. United States' Representative Dan Burton, co-author of the Helms-Burton Act, issued a subpoena for
Elian to appear on February 10th in front of a House Committee on Government Reform in Washington, both of which worked to push back the INS
deadline set for Elian's return on January 14, 2000.8
A. The State Custody Proceedings
On Friday, January 7, 2000, Elian's extended family in Miami filed for
temporary guardianship. 9 Circuit Court Judge Rosa Rodriguez of Miami-Dade
family court decided the issue and eventually did grant the temporary
guardianship order. The family in Miami elated, the father in Cuba devastated,
but the question remains whether or not this order really had little meaning
other than a small political battle was won in the war over Elian. This section
analyzes the significance of Judge Rodriguez's ruling to award a temporary
guardianship to the Miami relatives of Elian Gonzalez.
Although this case has not ripened into an actual custody dispute, it is
likely to move in that direction and the Florida law on this issue is helpful in
determining the ultimate question: where is Elian better off? The rule in
Florida regarding a custody dispute between a parent and third parties is quite
3.

Id

4.

Id

5.

Id

6.

Id.

7.

Pressley, supra note 2 at AOl.

8.
Associated Press, For Elian,Another Month in the States, The Palm Beach Post, January 8,
2000 at IA and 8A.
9.
Elaine De Valle et al., ProtestPlans Scaled Back as Legal Battles Renew Hope, The Miami
Herald, January 9, 2000 at Al.
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clear. "When the custody dispute is between a natural parent and third parties,
the test must include consideration of the right of a natural parent to enjoy
the custody, fellowship, and companionship of his offspring. This is a rule
older than the common law itself."' The case goes on to state that Florida law
"clearly provides that custody should be denied to the natural parent only when
such an award will, in fact, be detrimental to the welfare of the child."" This
court found nothing to suggest that the children were abandoned by their father,
only clear, convincing and compelling evidence showing the father is unfit or
that placement of the child with the father would be detrimental to the welfare
of the child would warrant such a denial.'2 Finally, without a finding such as
unfitness or a detrimental effect on the child, "the right of a natural parent is
3
...

paramount.'

In Sparks v. Reeves, the court stated directly, "Once the father's ability
reaches adequacy, his legal right should not be overcome by the fact that the
respondent's offerings may be more adequate than his, or that they may
continually out-do him, at least in material matters."' 4 Courts have also
determined what the meaning of detriment and that is "more than the normal
trauma caused to a child by uprooting him from familiar surroundings such as
often occurs by reason of divorce, death of a parent, or adoption. It
contemplates a longer term adverse effect that transcends the normal adjustment
period in such cases." 5 What these rules show is that mere ability to give more
material possessions to a child, or being in a more prosperous economic
environment to do so, may not transcend what is best for the child. But
detriment, must be determined within a longer term context. If Elian's relatives
can make a longer term argument that there will be detriment to Elian if he is
returned to Cuba, they might fit somewhat within this standard. The hardest
standard to overcome will be the predisposition of the courts and the paramount
natire of the parental rights. Based on this line of cases, state court family law
is not favorable to Elian's relatives in Miami.
There is case law very clearly stating that "where a parent has proved that
he or she is adequately able to care for his or her child in a manner keeping with
the child's welfare, the legal right of such parent may not be overcome by the

10.
In re the Marriage of Carter Robert Matzen and Judy C. Matzen, 600 So. 2d 487,488 (Fla. Ist
DCA 1992), citing In re Guardianship of D.A. McW., 460 So. 2d 368,370 (Fla. 1984), quoting State ex.Rel.
Sparks v. Reeves, 97 So. 2d 18, 10 (Fla.1957).
11.

Id at 488 (Fla. IstDCA 1992), citing In reGuardianshipofD.A. McW., 460 So. 2d 368,370.

12.

ld

13.

Id. at 488, quoting Daugharty v. Daugharty, 571 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).

14.

Reeves, 97 So. 2d 18, at 21.

15.

Matzen, 600 So. 2d at 488, quoting Filter v. Bennett, 554 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
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fact that another's offerings may be more copious." 16 Whatever economic
advantages the family in Miami has, this rule clearly states that the right of the
parent may not be overcome by that fact. The Fosterv. Sharpecourt went on
to conclude that:
[I]t is often true that parents may not be able to provide for their
children as fully and completely as another may be able to provide.
However, no parent could agree with a law which would demand that
a parent must relinquish his or her right of custody to another person
upon the basis of superior material advantages. 7

B. The Immigration and NaturalizationImplications
Currently, The United States-Cuba bilateral Migration Agreement controls
immigration policy of Cubans fleeing to the United States.18 The Agreement
provides approval of a floor of at least 20,000 Cubans for legal admission to the
United States, annually.' 9 This number was originally contemplated as an
absolute ceiling, but in 1991, this number was expanded to include human
rights activists, displaced professionals, and others. 2
Cuba, in exchange agreed to take "effective measures to deter unsafe
departure."'" Those picked up at sea by the United States Coast Guard were
returned to and confined to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and a United States
Military base in Panama, and as of 1995, this number was approximately
32,000.2 Upon arrival to the United States, an asylee, one reaching the United
States, has one year after the arrival to file an application for asylum.' A
"credible fear" interview takes place determining whether or not the applicant
has a credible fear of persecution if they are removed.u If a credible fear is
16. Foster v. Sharpe, 114 So. 2d 373, 374 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959), quoting Martens v. State ex rel.
Grossman, 100 So. 2d 440 (Fla. App. 1958), Sparks v. Reeves, 97 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1957), cf.Frazier v. Frazier,
109 Fla. 164, 147 So.2d 464, 466 (Fla. 1933).
17.

Foster v. Sharpe, 114 So. 2d 373, 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959).
18.
Latin America and The Caribbean Refugee Admission Program, (visited January 17, 2000)
<www.state.gov> (U.S. Department of State Website).
19.

Id.

20.

Id

21.
Matias F. Travierso-Diaz, Immigration Challenges and Opportunities in a Post-Transition
Cuba, 16 BERK. J. INT'L LAW 234, 244(1998).
22.
Id.
23.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Fact Sheet: U.S. Asylum andRefugee Policy, (visited
January 17, 2000) <www.ins.usdoj.gov> (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service Website) (hereinafter
Fact Sheet].
24.

Id
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determined, the alien is detained because they remain in removal proceedings
until a judge can rule on their asylum claim.2 5 In Elian's case his family has
filed for an asylum claim, but the INS ruled that Juan Miguel Gonzalez has the
"sole legal authority to speak on behalf of his son, regarding Elian's
immigration status in the United States. 26
IU.INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ANALYSIS

One of the most compelling aspects of the Elian Gonzalez tragedy at this
point is the lack of application of international law. There is an amount of
authority regulating what happens to children in situations such as these where
there is a potential custody dispute, where asylum is sought on behalf of a
minor or within the father's perspective an abduction has occurred. An action
brought by the father in Cuba under certain applicable international law could
bring more conflict and controversy to the issue, but may result in a swifter
resolution. One can only speculate on the reasons Juan Miguel Gonzalez has
not initiated an action under international authority or come to the United States
to seek the return of his son based on the original INS ruling, or initiated a
federal action through the United States legal system to seek the return of Elian.
Practically speaking,
[T]he international law of the child has no single source, but must
also be found in specific and general treaties, in the broad field of
human rights at both universal and regional levels, in the rules of
international humanitarian law, in customary international law and in
the law and practice of States and international agencies such as
UNICEF and UNHCR. 27
Even though a state, for instance the United States or Cuba, is not a
signatory to a specific treaty regulating children's right or human rights for that
matter does not mean the state will not be bound. It can still be bound through
customary international law. Even though states may end up being a signatory
to certain treaties regulating these issues, the ultimate authority is up to the
individual state where someone is seeking entry. A survey of applicable
international authority follows.

25.

Id.

26.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statement of Commissioner Doris Messner: INS
Decision in the Elian Gonzalez Case, (visited January 17, 2000) <www.ins.usdoj.gov> (U.S. Department of

Justice Website).
27. Guy S.Goodwin-Gill, Unaccompanied Refugee Minors, 3 INT'L J.OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 405
(1995) [hereinafter Refugee Minors].
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A. The United Nations and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
One such source of international law relative to the protection of child
refugees is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
established by the General Assembly under Article 22 of the United Nations
Charter.2 It operates within the narrow confines of the definition of a refugee
who are those "outside their own countries, with a well-founded fear of
persecution and [are] unwilling to return."29 Over the years, the UNHCR has
been called on to afford that protection for those outside the narrow definition."°
The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child uses a "best interests" of the
child type standard, but also looks at the rights and duties of the family and the
reasons for the displacement in the first place, Article 5 states:
[SItates are called on to] respect the responsibilities, rights and duties
of parents or, where applicable, the members of the extended family
or community as provided for by local custom, legal guardians or
other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide in a manner
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate
direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights
recognized in the present convention. 3
One profound provision is found in Article 29. It states "education should
not only prepare the child for responsible life in a free society; it should also be
directed to the development of respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms..." This provision is strong, stating, children have a right to develop
their lives in a free society with fundamental freedoms, questionable in Cuba
32
at this time.
The Convention discusses "durable solutions" which:
[C]ontribute to the child's survival and development, protect his or
her right to life, provide support for parents and caregivers, maintain
respect for culture and religious origins, protect the child against all
forms of exploitation, and ensure recognition of the child's right to
33
a name, a nationality and an identity.

28.

Id. at 407.

29.

Id

30.

Id

31.

Id at 410.

32.

Refugee Minors, supra note 27, at 411.

33.

Id. at 412.
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These durable solutions would be factors that a tribunal would have to weigh
in determining what shall be in the best interest of the child.
Also, of utmost importance under the convention, is the protection of the
family. This is linked to the protection of the child. 4 The intent is to preserve
family life, and the family should receive special protection from society and
the state." This argument is strong for Juan Miguel Gonzalez in Cuba, in that,
it is the obligation of states to maintain and protect the family unit. Durable
solutions must take into consideration all factors, with the best interest of the
child paramount, but the Convention on the Rights of the Child would highlight
"the questionable nature of any solution that might either seek to 'officially'
remove the child from the (actual or potential) family environment ... ."36
These provisions are equally as strong for an action by Elian's father in Cuba.
These rights are also attached to the Convention of Rights of the Child.
Article 12, § 1 states that parties should "assure to the child who is capable of
forming his or her own view the right to express those views freely in all
matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in
accordance with the age and maturity of the child.""' The difficulty of this
provision is demonstrated by the current case in that Elian is six years of age,
calling into question his ability to determine what his views are about where his
interests are best served. This must be treated in a different way with regards
to such a young child. The standard is for the child who is capable of forming
their own views and this may not be likely in the case of Elian Gonzalez, due
to his young age.
Article 12 also states in pertinent part:
For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the
opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative
proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a
representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the
procedural rules of national law. 38
These Articles mandate an opportunity to be heard, through individual
representation or that of another, but the actual weight these provisions receive
is unclear in Elian's case.

34.

Id. at 414.

35.

Id.

36.

Id.

37.

Refugee Minors, supra note 27, at 415.
38.
Marie-Francoise Lucker-Babel, The Right ofthe Child to Express Views and to be Heard-An
Attempt to Interpret Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 3 Iwr'L J. OF CHILD .EN'S

RIGHTs 391, 394 (1995) [hereinafter Article 12].
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The right to be heard is also bestowed upon the parent. Article 9.2 states,
"all interested parties shall be given an opportunity to participate in the
proceedings and make their views known. '39 Once again this leads us to the
conclusion that it should be imperative for Juan Miguel Gonzalez to be
permitted to be included in the proceedings with respect to Elian. Clearly,
within Article 9.2, it is a protected right for him to invoke.
Article 12.1 also addresses the issue of the capacity of the forming views.
It states that the child should be capable of forming his or her own views, but
does not require that the child "enjoy full development" because his or her
opinion will be considered with their age and maturity in mind.' The standard
in the Article is that we must first determine if the child is in a position to have
an idea about the issue, but they do not have to understand the "full spectrum"
of all the issues.' To understand the value of the feelings of the child, there
must be interaction and determination by a specialist such as a child
42
psychologist.
The most important aspect of the provision is that the child's opinion is
given freely or "without any external pressure or influence liable of damaging
the formation of the child's own and original opinion."' 3 This is all but
impossible in Elian's case. With trips to Disney World, a new puppy, and
enrollment in a new school, it is difficult to arrive at any decision that would be
free from some level of pressure. Also, we are not privy to the conversations
that Elian has with his father on the phone to determine if there is any pressure
from him. There is an implied responsibility to assure that the child can arrive
at such an opinion without direct or indirect pressure and that "they have not
received any partial or abridged information."" If there is such an influence:
[T]he judge will not consider the child's opinion if he finds out that
the child eipresses an opinion influenced by the position of one of
his or her parents, or that the circumstances under which the opinion
is expressed are not favorable to free expression (stress, fear,
inhibition of the child).4'
Because of situations like these, where it is next to impossible to arrive at
a determination of the child's feelings without some level of influence, Article

39.

Id.

40.

id. at 397.

41.
42.
43.

Article 12, supra note 38, at 394.
Id. at 397.
Idat398.

44.

Id.

45.

Id.
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12.1 simply requires "consideration" of the child's opinion and not that the
decision shall be what the child wishes.' Therefore, in relation to Elian' s case,
a statement made by Elian to Senator Smith of New Hampshire upon visiting
Elian, "Ayddame, Sefior Smith, por favor (Please help me Mr. Smith)" cannot
be highly considered. 7 Then Smith continued by saying that "he said to me
that he does not want to go back to Cuba." These statements cannot be taken
to be anything other than used for their media value. Senator Smith is not an
expert in child psychology, nor can there be any determination whether or not
Elian was coached into making the statemefits. These types of statements
cannot come within the context of this provision of Article 12.
Another aspect of the Convention, that is stronger in relation to the side of
the relatives in Miami seeking to keep Elian in the United States, is the
procedural aspect of the right to be heard. Article 12.1 is general but states,
"Parties have the obligation to promote this right [to be heard] without
excluding either any aspect of the child's life or the authors, persons and
institutions playing a role in his or her life."" 9 These procedural safeguards
should include someone in charge of receiving the child's opinion, deadlines
respected, follow-up to continually gather the child's opinion, and the right to
appeal a decision.' It would seem that the relatives in Miami are pulling out
legal stops to afford Elian his right to be heard, but it is unclear whether they
are utilizing the necessary professionals to do so, and giving Elian the
environment where he can express such views without any pressure. The one
issue left open in this provision is the role of Juan Miguel Gonzalez, and this
involvement is questionable at best in that he has continually stated publicly
that he has no intention of coming to the United States to further involve
himself in proceedings.

B. The Hague Convention
The original Hague Convention was held in 1980 and included rules
regarding when a parent of a signatory country takes a child to another
signatory state in order to avoid a custody decision.5 ' Although Cuba is not a

46.
47.

Article 12, supra note 38, at 394.
Elaine De Valle et al., Protest PlansScaled Back as Legal Battles Renew Hope, The Miami

Herald, January 9, 2000 at Al.
48.

Id

49.

LUicker-Babel, supra note 38, at 400.

50.

Id. at 401.

June Staff, The Global Battlefield: Culture and InternationalChild Custody Disputes at
51.
Century's End, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L 791,793-94 (1998).
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signatory to the Convention as of 1996, the United States is, signing on in
1988.52
The Hague is a procedurally based authority, and in Article l(a) it's goal
is to "secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained
in one Contracting State." 3 Article 1(b) states that another goal is to "ensure
that rights of custody and of access under the law of some Contracting States
are effectively respected in the other Contracting States." 5' In addition, it
requires that an administrative Central Authority is established to deal with the
requests coming in and going out for the use of the Convention to aid in that
process.5"
One must prove that a child is wrongfully detained in order for the
Convention to be invoked. Article 3 lists the factors that must be proven:
[B]reach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or
any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in
which the child was habitually a resident immediately before the
removal or retention; and at the time of removal or retention those
rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have
been so exercised but for the removal or retention.5
The concept of "pre-custody" rights is used to determine the rights that
arise out of the marriage and are vested in both parents.' These rights are
abridged when "one parent wrongfully leaves the country with the child, which
is the action that constitutes wrongful removal."" This is the situation that is
stated to have occurred by Juan Miguel Gonzalez, in that, his ex-wife, Elian's
mother Elisabeth Brotons, wrongfully removed him from Cuba.
The major problem in the use of invoking the Hague Convention is that
Cuba appears to not be a signatory to the treaty. There were an original twentyone countries that signed on in 1980, the United States signed on in 1988, and
another twenty-four countries signed on in 1996 of which Cuba is not listed.59
Whether Cuba has acceded or the Convention can be invoked through other
principles such as customary international law, may not overcome the principle

52.
53.

id. at 794.
Id

54.

Id.

55.

Id.

56. Star, supra note 51, at 795.
57. Id
58. Id.
59. Id at 794, quoting Hague Convention on Private International Law, Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 6, 1980, 19 LLM. 1501 art. 4.
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that a country cannot be bound by that to which it has not signed. Plainly, the
"focus is on the child and the States; both States must have signed the Hague
convention for a parent or custodial guardian to invoke its formal institutional
structures. ' 60
Our inquiry does not end there. There are situations between a Hague
signatory country and non-signatory country. A specific line of cases deals
with cultural differences and disputes in child custody involving the Muslim
culture and a non-Muslim parent. One aspect that must be considered, is that
there are seven defenses to keep a child from being returned to their habitual
residence. One of these defenses would be in the case of the other parent
consenting to or subsequently acquiescing in the removal or retention of the
child, having not brought legal action within one year's time.6' If Cuba was a
signatory country, this could possibly be one defense which has been raised by
the extended family in Miami seeking custody. But, since Cuba is not a
signatory, these seven defenses are deemed inapplicable, thus strengthening
Juan Miguel Gonzalez's position.
Currently, in non-Hague cases, not only do the defenses not apply, but the
child has no representation or voice in the proceedings. 62 The parties to the
dispute in Elian' s case would be his father and mother, but since his mother is
now deceased, the family in Miami is filling that roll. The current trend in
international law is to allow input from'the child. "In the last decade, the
international community has begun to recognize that children do have human
and civil rights and are not merely appendages of their parents."
Now, when a non-Hague parent is involved, American judges tend to
consider the country as a state under United States Federal law and invoke the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act." Invoking these two domestic federal laws is the non-Hague parent's
advantage.
When courts interpret foreign country as a state it means that:
(1) the child is returned to the country and place of "habitual
residence" regardless of any extenuating circumstances (i.e. Hague
defenses) that may exist, or (2) the American court gives comity to
the custody hearing in a non-Hague country and accedes to their
jurisdiction.'
60. Id. at 797.
61.
Star, supra note 51, at 808.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 795.
64. Id. at 808.
65.
Id., quotin8Hosain v. Malik, 108 Md. App. 284 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) and In re Marriage
of Laila Adeeb Sawaya, 182 Cal. App. 3d 1018 (Ct. App. 1986).
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Thus, a parent from a non-signatory country such as Cuba, would have an
advantage over the Miami family in a United States federal court.
The Hague Convention must be viewed as only a procedural device to
determine where the actual custody dispute should take place. Under the Hague
Convention, the custody dispute should be heard in "the country and
community which constituted the 'habitual residence' of the child."" This
determination does not look at the custody dispute at all, the quality of care the
child would be receiving, but creates the "status quo" of what was occurring
before the child's abduction.6 7 Invoking these provisions would probably mean
an immediate return of Elian to his father, and any challenge would meet dismal
failure in a Cuban court.
The biggest flaw in the use of this Convention is the lack of appearance of
rights of the child. The best interests of the child are not taken into account,
thus more favorable for Elian's father than his Miami relatives. This
philosophy is in direct contradiction with the Convention on the Rights of the
Child which spells out specific norms and right the child has. Without even
discussing the problems of conflict of laws between international, federal, and
state law, philosophies governing international authority themselves contradict
one another, thus making Elian's plight even more confusing.

El. UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LEGISLATION ENACTING THE HAGUE
CONVE"NON

A. The InternationalChild Abduction Remedies Act
The International Child Abduction Remedies Act 42 U.S.C. § 11601
(ICARA), is the domestic Act which "links" United States law to the Hague
Convention." "ICARA authorizes parties seeking to enforce rights under the
Convention to file a petition in a court of appropriate jurisdiction in the place
State and federal courts have concurrent
where the child is located."'
jurisdiction to hear a petition, but if wrongful retention occurs, it is the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 that is invoked.
On July 27, 1999, an action was brought in the United States District
Court, Southern District of Florida in Pesin v. Rodriguez, under ICARA and the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. 0
The facts of the dispute were that a father brought the action claiming, the wife
66.

Starr, supra note 51, at 828.

67.

Id.

68.

Id. at 800.

69.

Id.
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Pesin v. Rodriguez, No. 99-6962, 1999 WL 1249760, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 16, 1999).
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"wrongfully retained their two children in the United States, and that the
children must therefore be returned to their "habitual residence" of Venezuela.7'
The wife was contending that the children's habitual residence was the United
States, that the father was not exercising custody at the time of the wrongful
detention, and that the father acquiesced to the children's residency in the
United States. 72 The court held the father had established a case of wrongful
retention and that the children should return to their habitual residence in
Venezuela. The court found that the habitual residence was Venezuela and the
wife's retention of the children was in violation of Venezuelan law and that the
father was exercising custody at the time of the wrongful retention.73 The court
also found that the father did not acquiesce to the wife's retention of the
74
children in the United States.
In situations where there is a petition for return of the children in state
court and another is subsequently filed in federal court, this court stated that the
federal district court had jurisdiction. 7s Further, under ICARA, "a person may
file a petition for the return of a child in any court authorized to exercise
jurisdiction in the place where the child is located at the time the petition is
filed., 76 Only the abduction claim, not the actual custody dispute, may be
decided under ICARA.77
To show wrongful retention the petition must show the following by a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) the habitual residence of the children
"immediately before" the date of the alleged wrongful retention was not where
the child is now; (2) the retention is in violation of [Venezuelan] law; and (3)
petitioner was exercising custody of the child at the time of the alleged
wrongful retention.7" Habitual residence in this instance probably does not
warrant discussion because it is fairly apparent that Elian's habitual residence
is Cuba. Here, there is no public knowledge whether there was a joint custody
decree in Elian's case. If there was, and it stated that Elian's mother could not
remove him from Cuba without Juan Miguel's permission, she may have indeed
violated Cuban law. Therefore, the retention of Elian by his relatives in Miami,
could be a breach of Cuban law. To determine whether Juan Miguel was
exercising custody of the child, the standard identified was whenever "such a
71.
Venezuela was a signatory to the Hague Convention in the second twenty-four countries that
signed on in 1996. Starr, supra note 51, at 791 n.14.
72.

Pesin, 1999 WL 1249760, at 1.

73.

Id.

74.

Id.

75.

Id. at5, citing Lops v. Lops, 140 P.3d 927, 934-42 (llth Cir. 1998).

76.
77.

Pesin, 1999 WL 1249760 at 5.
Id. quoting Article 19 of the Hague Convention and 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b).

78.

Id. citing Hague Convention art. 3.
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parent with dejure custody rights keeps, or seeks to keep, any sort of regular
contact with his or her child."79 This was already determined in the INS
ruling.'
Custody rights may arise under three different operative mechanisms: (1)
by operation of law; (2) by judicial or administrative decision, or (3) an
agreement having legal effect under the law of that state."' Unless there is
"clear and unequivocal abandonment of the child" and the parent has valid
custody rights in the country of habitual residence, a court will be hard pressed
to find that there was no exercise. 2 This issue seems to have already been
resolved by the INS.
In regards to the issue of acquiescence, use of this defense must "be shown
by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner consented to or
subsequently acquiesced the children remaining in the United States. 83
Acquiescence must be an "act or statement with the requisite formality, such as
testimony in a judicial proceeding; a convincing written enunciation of rights;
or a consistent attitude of acquiescence over a significant period of time."'"
"Subsequent acquiescence requires more than an isolated statement to a thirdparty. Each of the words and actions of a parent during separation are not to be
scrutinized for a possible waiver of custody rights." 5 The Friedrich6 court,
found that the secretive nature surrounding the circumstances in which the wife
left with the children is "extremely strong" evidence that the husband would not
have consented to removal of the children.87 Finally, regarding acquiescence,
it is a "question of the actual subjective intention of the wronged parent, not of
the outside world's perception of his intentions." ' These rules are quite clear
in that Elian's father has made it known to the world that he seeks the return of
Elian, no matter what the political implications are of whether he is free to
speak his mind. The law seems quite clear, that he must manifest this with
some level of formality and that statements to the family are not enough to meet

79.

IM quoting Friedrichv. Friedrich,78 F.3d 1060 (6th Cir. 1996).

80.

DeYoung & Pressley, supranote 2.

81.
82.

Pesin, 1999 Wi, 1249760, at 9.
Id quoting Friedrichv. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1066 (6th Cir. 1996).

83.

Id citing Hague Convention art. 13(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(B).

84.
85.

Id. quoting Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1070 (6th Cir. 1996).
Id. citing Wanningerv. Wanninger,850 F. Supp. 78, 81-82 (D. Mass. 1994).

86.

Friedrichv. Friedrich,78 F.3d 1060 (6th Ci. 1996).

87.

Pesin, 1999 WL 1249760, at 9.

88.
Id, citing Re H and Others, 2 W.LR. 563, 573B (1997), Friedrichv. Friedrich, 78 F. 3d at
1060 (6th Cir. 1996), Wanninger v. Wanninger, 850 F. Supp. At 78 (D. Mass. 1994), and Horlanderv.
Horlander,1992 Bull. Civ. I, No 91-18.177.
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this standard.89 The father has neither given any written manifestation of
renunciation of rights or conveyed a consistent attitude of acquiescence over a
significant period of time. Quite to the contrary, he has used worldwide media
attention to say exactly the opposite.
Another defense that is available under ICARA is "grave risk." Article
13(b) states that a "court may refuse to order the return of a child wrongfully
removed or retained if there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose
the child to physical or psychological harm."9° The only evidence that could be
admitted was that regarding the child's surroundings; that the child would be
returned to and the basic qualities of the people there.9 Arguments under this
exception for Elian's relatives in Miami would be tenuous92at best, and courts
have "found in all cases that the exception did not apply.
This case can be distinguished fromElian's situation in several ways. The
first difference is that both the United States and Venezuela are signatories to
the Hague Convention, while Cuba is not. Both parents were alive fighting for
custody of the child, while Elian' s mother is deceased and there is no publicly
known testamentary documentation conveying her wishes. In specific instances
it has been stated by the family and politicians there is evidence that Juan
Miguel Gonzalez knew about the fateful trip, but cannot communicate so
because of Cuba's oppressive Communist regime.9 Unfortunately, it would
seem that this new evidence would have to be very compelling to overcome the
standard set out to meet "acquiescence." Under ICARA, it would seem Juan
Miguel Gonzalez would have a very strong case, in which the typical defenses
under the Hague Convention, including acquiescence, could not be invoked
since Cuba is not a signatory to the Convention.
B. The Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, (UCCJA) was adopted by
forty-seven states in 1981, for the purpose of preventing parents from
kidnapping their children and taking them to a state where they can get a better
decision in a child custody dispute." Before the act, parents who abducted their
children had a very good chance of receiving custody because courts had the
authority to issue a custody order simply based on the parent's physical
89.

Cuban Boy Spends Holidays in U.S. (visited January 2, 2000) <www.msnbc.com/local>.

Scott M. Smith, Annotation, Construction and Application of InternationalChild Abduction
90.
Remedies Act, 42. U.S.C.A. § 11601, 125 A.LR. 217,214 (1999).
91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.
Luisa Yanez & Jose Dante Para Herrera, Cuban Boy's Father Allowed Trip to US., Senator
Says, "he Sun Sentinel, January 9, 2000 at Al.
94.

Star, supra note 51, at 801.
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presence in a state with the child.95 When the UCCJA was enacted it's primary
focus was to prevent this fromoccurring by: "setting standards concerning the
state's right to make a custody determination, limiting the right of state courts
to modify sister state custody orders, and requiring recognition and enforcement
of custody orders in other states."" The mechanism for doing this was the
custody suit was to be heard in the child's home state because of the general
thought that it is the jurisdiction with the most information regarding the
child.97
"By 1997, a majority of United States' states had stated that the UCCJA
could be extended to apply to international child kidnapping." The UCCJA
had a specific provision, International Applications, that if enacted by a state,
would make the Act applicable to international kidnappings." Six states have
provided that they do not exist on an equal footing with a foreign country
including: Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Indiana
taking a somewhat hybrid approach allowing modification if the child is likely
to be moved outside of the United States, the courts may modify the foreign
custody agreement."'0 In Elian's case, since Florida is not identified as a state
rejecting this notion, Florida state law will likely consider a state to include a
foreign country in it's application and therefore would require a custody
hearing to occur in the home state of the child.
C. The ParentalKidnappingPreventionAct of 1980 and the International
ParentalKidnapping Crime Act of 1993
To fill the gaps in the UCCJA and require the respect between sister states
of child custody agreements, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)
of 1980 was drafted and passed.' The Act, Section 8, 28 U.S.C. § 1738(A),
requires all states UCCJA and non-UCCJA to respect a sister state's divorce
and custody decrees if they are made in conformity with federal jurisdictional
criteria. " States must enforce, not modify, child custody determinations made
by courts of sister states.0 3 The PKPA even puts a priority on a home state

95.

Id. at 802.

96.

Id.

97.

Id.

98.

Id.

99.

Starr, supra note 51, at 803.
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Id.
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decree over one made by a state with a significant connection to the child.'"
In this way, any custody decree that may exist in Cuba would trump a state
court's ruling awarding custody to Elian's family in Miami.
Another interesting aspect of the PKPA is that simply because a child is
absent from a state, a court is not precluded from determining the child's
custody. 05 Further, an action in a home state, could preclude proceedings
"from being brought later or continued in a different state."'' "° With respect to
Juan Miguel Gonzalez, under the United States law, a Cuban decree bestowing
custody of Elian upon him, would have to be honored and the custody hearing
would have to take place in Cuba.
Similar to the PKPA, in 1993, Congress enacted the International Parental
Kidnapping Crime Act (IPKCA) of 1993, which focused on closing the gap of
when a child is abducted to a non-Hague Convention country.' 0 7 The Act is
applicable in situations where a child is removed from the United State or a
child is retained outside the United States with the intent to obstruct the lawful
exercise of parental rights." Although this Act would seem to have very
limited applicability in the Elian Gonzalez case, it is no less important to note
that United States domestic legislation does attempt to address the kidnapping
issue within an international context.
Although legally it has not been established that Elian' s mother did indeed
kidnap Elian, without Juan Miguel Gonzalez'a consent, .a survey of the
applicable law is relevant to determine if he does indeed bring an action, what
the likely outcome will be. It would seem that proof to refute such an action
would be difficult, since Elian' s mother is now deceased and that Gonzalez may
indeed have a claim under some of these Acts.
D. Other ControllingInternationalAuthority
There are other sources that provide guidance and authority regarding the
custody of Elian Gonzalez, including resolutions of the United Nations. One
such resolution is one which adopted Principles Relating to the Protection and
Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and
Adoption." Section A sets out the goals of the Resolution including: "high
104.
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priority to family and child welfare, paramount consideration of the child's best
interests, needs for affection and right to security,. . . guarantee of a name, a
nationality and a legal representative for the child.""' The Resolution also
reaffirms Principle 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, which states
that "the child shall, wherever possible, grow up in the care and under the
responsibility of his parents and, in any case, in an atmosphere of affection and
of moral and material security."'.
Section A, Article 3 states explicitly, "The first priority for a child is to be
cared for by his or her own parents.""' Article 4 states, "When care by the
child's parents is unavailableor inappropriate,care by relatives of the child's
parents, by another substitute - foster or adoptive family or, if necessary, by an
appropriate institution should be considered."''" Article 5 states, "In all matters
relating to the placement of a child outside the care of the child's own parents;
the best interests of the child, particularly his or her need for affection and right
4
to security and continuing care, should be the paramount consideration.""
These provisions affirm Juan Miguel Gonzalez's strong argument for the return
of Elian.
Section B, relates to foster care but also explicitly states in Article 11,
"Foster family care, though temporary in nature, may continue, if necessary,
until adulthood but should not preclude either prior return to the child's own
parents or adoption.""' 5 Article 12, mandates that in proceedings regarding
foster care placement, the child's parents should be "properly involved.""' 6
Article 19, states procedural aspects of the provisions in that "policies should
be established and laws enacted, where necessary, for the prohibition of
abduction and of any other act for illicit placement of children.""' 7
Although these provisions are probably not widely utilized, what they do
indicate is a strong predisposition of the United Nations to place the child with
his or her natural parents. It can also be implied that no such action shall take
place unless the parents are involved; and the Resolution suggests that nations
invoke provisions within their domestic laws furthering these objectives, which
the United States has done. Elian's relatives in Miami seeking custody have a
large hurdle to overcome, since it seems to be implied from these provisions
that the best interests of the child is by default, custody with the natural parent.
110. Id. at 1097.
111. Id. at 1098.
112. Id. at 1099.
113. Id.
114. THERESOLulnoNONTHEPROTEcTONANDWELFAREOF CHLDREN, supra note 109, at1099.
115. Id. at 1100.
116. Id.
117. I at 1101.
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IV. CONCLUSION

One merely has to pick up the newspaper or turn on CNN to hear about the
Elian Gonzalez tragedy. The thought of a five-year-old child clinging to a life
ring for two days and being rescued at sea by fishermen on the day when the
United States is celebrating a day of giving thanks is heartwrenching.
Understanding that his mother and stepfather drowned on the perilous journey,
is even more heartwrenching, and knowing that he is with relatives, but without
his living parent brings little comfort. It matters not what side a person is on
in this tragedy, but what remains difficult is distancing ourselves from the
plight and analyzing the situation within the context of law.
State law on the issue seems fairly clear providing that custody should be
denied to the natural parent only when such an award will, in fact, be
detrimental to the welfare of the child."' International law under several
authorities seems to indicate a predisposition for placing the child with third
parties unless the parent is unfit. International law seems even more biased
towards a parent who is seeking custody from a non-Hague signatory country,
since the many defenses cannot be invoked. Other sources of federal domestic
and international law seem to echo the same premise, but what remains is the
necessity for Juan Miguel Gonzalez to bring a recovery action in a United
States court.
One thing all those having any knowledge of the issue can be assured of
is that continued political posturing will take place. Accusations about Elian's
mother and stepfather will continue, but this type of campaigning from the
Castro regime will serve no productive purpose in the development of Elian." 9
While Castro's accusations fly, Elian's relatives in Miami continue to give him
gifts, a new puppy, and a trip to Disney World. A child's perspective of the
issues surrounding his plight cannot be unbiased when the family is not
providing an environment where he can make choices that are not pressured by
the priority items in a six-year-old's life. All sides continue to invoke the use
of propaganda and material possessions to try to pressure decisions makers.
This situation becomes even more complicated by the involvement of such
entities as the United States Congress, through anti-Castro politicians such as
Dan Burton and Jesse Helms, co-authors of the Helms-Burton Act regulating
economic relationships with Cuba. Involvement of the United States Council
of Churches in this situation further complicates everything by potentially
adding religious implications to a political debate that should be grounded in
118. In re the Marriage of Carter Robert Matzen& Judy C. Matzen, 600 So. 2d 487,488 (Fla. Ist
DCA 1992) quoting In re Guardianship of D.A. McW., 460 So. 2d at 370.
119. Antonio Paneque Brizuelas, The Journey on Which Was Taken Was Organized by a Criminal,
Granma International Digital Edition, (visited January 2, 2000) <www.granma.cu>.
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the law."2 Luckily, these religious implications have been downplayed in the
circus of media attention surrounding the situation.
Protests by Miami's powerful anti-Castro exile community have worked
in situations to all but shut down the City. Protests in Cuba increase and
become angrier.'' Local politicians in Miami use their Washington relationships to fight for Elian to remain in the United States. Castro continues to
posture bringing to the United States attention again, to the problematic policies
that exist in relation to larger immigration policy. While all this is occurring,
Juan Miguel Gonzalez, for reasons unknown, has initiated no formal legal
proceedings seeking the return of his son. Whether that is because he lives
under an oppressive Communist regime or simply because he chooses to refuse
the necessity of participating in the United States legal process to secure
custody of his son, we as outsiders, can only speculate. One thing in this sea
of uncertainty does remain certain, however, that the greatest victim in this case
is Elian Gonzalez, himself.
V. RULINGS AS OF MARCH 22, 2000
On March 21, 2000, United States District Judge K. Michael Moore, ruled
in favor of the Attorney General of the United States, Janet Reno, on a Motion
for Summary Judgment, dismissing the law suit brought on behalf of Elian
Gonzalez, by Lazaro Gonzalez, his Great Uncle. The Motion for Summary
Judgment upheld the decision by Janet Reno,' holding she did not abuse her
discretion in ordering Elian's return to Cuba and her decision that only the
boy's father speaks for him was found controlling as a matter of law." 2 While
the arguments brought on behalf of Elian were largely based on a theory that
Elian was denied procedural due process rights, these rights were found not to
be violated by Reno's actions." 2 The court found no abuse of her discretion
and that her decisions were consistent with statute and congressionally
delegated discretion." 5 The court did find in favor of Elian by holding the
United States District Court did have subject matter jurisdiction and Elian
Gonzalez did have standing to sue through Lazaro Gonzalez. 26
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Many arguments were made by the government based on the theory that
the decisions made were within the purview of administrative decision making
authority, which was broad in this instance." 7 Many of the decisions Reno
made surrounding process were also exempt from judicial review. '
In the final analysis, Reno's decisions were upheld as coming within her
discretion and that Elian's due process rights were not violated. The court
found that a person paroled, or admitted until INS rules on his or her status, is
not entitled to the same constitutional protections as a citizen of the United
29
States.
There has been contentions that the family has filed an appeal with the
11th Circuit United States Court of Appeals, which would be inevitable. How
high within the United States system will this case go remains unknown, and
finally, how long Elian will be allowed to stay in the United States remains
unknown as well. In Judge Moore's conclusion, ".... the reality that each
passing day is another day lost between Juan Gonzalez and his son, [this] Court
can only hope that those on each side of this litigation placed the interests of
Elian Gonzalez above all others.""' This hope can be the only clear aspiration
that is guiding both family and citizens on both sides of the issue and on both
sides of the Florida Straits.
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